former Chief Economist at the World Bank and Nobel laureate in economics.
1 Stiglitz had criticized both the World Bank and the IMF as institutions whose policies heighten poverty in the developing world, rather than reduce it. all his academic brilliance, had neglected to reevaluate academic theories that undervalued free markets, despite glaring evidence to the contrary in the form of recent collapses of centrally planned societies and the success of market economies. 4 Today, only a few years after the speech, Dawson's dig at Stiglitz might be expected to produce a very different effect on an
audience. Yet even the recent cataclysmic financial events in the world's freest and least regulated markets perhaps should not be taken as a final answer, since disaster seems to have shown itself to be an equal opportunity lender over time towards both centrally planned and free market economies. Without analyzing events within "the long sweep of history," 5 one falls into the erroneous logic of what historian Fernand Braudel called "event history" ("l'histoire événementielle").
6
The infinite variables of context defy analytical mastery of social, legal, and economic phenomena. Reducing variables for purposes of study is indispensable for analysis to occur. On the other hand, without vast numbers of variables encompassed in the set of givens, results NATIONS 330-38 (1996) . 3 Id. (emphasis added). 4 See id. 5 See infra notes 20-22, and surrounding text. 6 See Fernand Braudel, Histoire et Sciences sociales La longue durée, 13 ANNALES E.S.C. 725, 728 (1958) .
cannot be reliable. It has been pointed out that economic models entice by appealing to the longing for certainty, "the hope [that it may be possible] to resolve, once and for all, existing questions . . . ." 7 Empirical studies, statistical formulae, quantification in general, suggest the sort of rigor of analysis and concomitant confidence of result that the seventeenth century mathematician-jurist Samuel Pufendorf (who also incidentally has been called "the grandfather of modern economics" 8 ) sought to give law by developing a complex, mathematically organized system of jurisprudence.
9
Comparative law has had a different focus. The modern comparative enterprise has come far in a struggle to accept inevitable imprecision, to admit to its own fuzziness born of intuition and insight. 10 It has come so far in this struggle that at times it even may be said to embrace those attributes. If it does so, this may be because comparative law is used to thinking in terms of millennia, of being a field in which some still care whether Roman law interpolations occurred only at the time of Justinian's codification or if modifications of Roman legal texts also were common from the third through sixth centuries.
11
The Legal Origins Thesis ("Legal Origins" or "LLSV" 12 ) contrasts countries with common and civil-law origins, correlating common-law origins with conditions more propitious to freer, less regulated markets, and greater economic well-being. 13 Comparative law to date largely has ignored or rejected LLSV, developed and promulgated by economists, but LLSV has been influential both practically and in other academic fields. 14 distinctions are fading in significance. 40 Yet at the same time, the past configurations leading to the new formations have not disappeared, such that comparatists who have a sense of the contexts and of the complexities lurking unseen behind the new turns in the roads will be able to facilitate discovering and understanding newly confusing hybridities by shedding light on dissociations, re-associations, and correlations. 41 A French philosopher wrote that "all access to the real is by encounter." 42 The brilliant
German-British comparatist Otto Kahn-Freund, observed that a very great amount of encounter is required before cross-contextual or polycontextual 43 understanding will occur. 44 As seasoned translators in the figurative sense, 45 comparatists should be well positioned to facilitate effective communication among those who may have much in common substantively within the transnational functionalist alignments that have been gaining ever greater importance, but among whose members communication gaps remain. 46 Finally, comparatists should be optimally situated to assist in constructing polycontextual mechanisms and institutions of law.
The status of comparative law has been rising in some visible ways. The Court of cassation, the private and criminal law Supreme Court of France, has included a comparative law working group for several years in recognition of the importance of the field to its work. 47 It also requests comparative law studies from academic or research institutions on matters of gr significance.
eat 48 Transnational judicial contacts and increased official recognition of the importance of comparative law are on the increase in many parts of the world. 49 Similarly, Justice Breyer of the U.S. Supreme Court asked the law schools of the United States to teach more foreign and comparative law to their students, so that the next generation of lawyers will be able to teach it to United States judges through the briefs they write to domestic courts. 50 Even
Justice Scalia has argued that I do believe … comparative law might indeed well be made a mandatory subject in United States Law schools, because I believe that, just as you do not understand your own language until you have taken some foreign language-be that Latin, German, whatever-so also I think you don't understand your own legal system until you see how ordering of the same matters could be done in a different way. There is perhaps a source of deeper concern that LLSV evokes for comparatists today, however. I am hardly the first to note that LLSV's division between common-and civil-law is problematic. 55 It is interesting to note that it seems not so very long ago that the proponents of just that difference were innovators in comparative law. Particularly in the United States, where the tradition of comparative law had taken root thanks to the generation of émigrés, 56 the successor generation started to accentuate theories of difference, and stressed in particular the differences separating the common and civil-law worlds.
The human catastrophe of the 1930s and 1940s caused a return to natural law theories after the Second World War, a movement of reversal in the trend away from natural law that had been taking place. It has been argued that "existing scholarship has tended to underestimate the role of anti-totalitarianism in postwar judicial doctrine and to ignore the influence of totalitarianism on contemporary constitutional theorists." 57 I have argued elsewhere that the rise of Hitler had a particularly important influence on post-war comparative law, both in Western
Europe and the United States. 58 It is against the backdrop of a universalist outlook that the postémigré generation focused on difference. This was not, at least not by all such legal comparatists, in order to espouse an ideology of difference, 59 but rather to develop a methodology for replicating practices the émigrés had employed thanks to individual skills often not articulated theoretically.
60
Yet, no sooner had these directions been established, and mainstream comparative law had started to take it as self-evident that laws could not be compared in isolation from a panoply 
COMP. L. 171, 180 (2001)
. Professor Sacco referred to my own work in this area as espousing an ideology of difference, in Cultural Immersion, supra note19, an article which, however, as its title suggests, specifically addressed the situation of comparative law in the United States and from the vantage point of the crisis for comparative law within the country due to the loss of the generation of multicultural, multilingual émigré comparatists. In the case of some comparatists, the description may be justified, however. For instance, Pierre Legrand writes: I argue in favour of incommensurability as the radical absence of common ground between different orders of legal knowledge. "Common ground," any "common ground," must assume a metalanguage; but the empirical fact is that there is no metalanguage that can dispense with idiomaticity. What there is across laws, and all there is, is an abyss -an untranslatable abyss. As the world changes, comparative law may need to go beyond even new method, and even beyond understanding that method will change as substance changes, that the first is no more time-resistant than the subjects of study. Yet methodological contingency itself is a most difficult pill to swallow for legal comparatists, for if methodology is not the polestar in the eternal shifts in substance, vocabulary, and significance, the field itself may be too mercurial to warrant being taken seriously, or even to staking credible claims to be taken seriously.
Nevertheless, comparative law may need to reinvent itself in order to be adequate to the tasks of elucidating and affecting polycontextual law. It also may need to reinvent itself on an ongoing basis. This may be because the comparatist at the end of the day has a job that inescapably depends on judgment and on the ability to improvise. From the eighteenth century onwards, methodologies have been sought for fields in the social and political sciences, so that "judgment need never again be a matter of instinct and flair and sudden illuminations and strokes of unanalysable genius; rather it should henceforth be built upon the foundations of indubitable knowledge." 63 The issue remains as to how many laws and rules apply to comparative legal analysis, and whether knowledge in our field can be advanced by applying "proven methods to new subject-matter in co-operation with others working as a team (as in some of the natural sciences)
or simply for the purpose of providing material for some more powerful or imaginative mind . . the new construction, if it is created by a man of creative as well destructive talent, has an immense and liberating effect upon his contemporaries, since it removes from them the weight of a no longer intelligible past, and a use of language which cramps the intellect and causes the kind of frustrating perplexity which is very different from those real problems which carry the seeds of their own solution in their formulation. The new system, born of an act of rebellion, then becomes a kind of new orthodoxy, and discip original man of genius had perhaps not conceived of applying them. This is sometimes successful, and sometimes leads to a new and equally arid and obfuscating scholasticism. 68 This in turn will create the need for a new language to meet the realities of a new day.
Our field just now may be undergoing the temptations of a "politics of re-definition" 69 of self to maximize the enhanced role that universal acknowledgment of globalization may allow comparative law to claim. 70 Yet, it is really a "policy of re-definition" of self that may be needed, more precisely: a policy of ever-renewed definition
Conclusion
A poet of the French resistance, René Char, believed that poets are those who can show others how to stand up straight. 71 Unlike those who have a more comfortable niche in society, he believed that poets know how to adapt to the surprises of the earth, a task his generation sorely needed as it saw the unpredictable's primacy over the predictable. Comparatists also aspire to adapt to the surprises of the earth, to the unexpected and the unseen. This is a broad aspiration, but, as Clifford Geertz reassuringly said about anthropology, it does not mean that it is "necessary to know everything in order to understand something." 73 
